ANASTACIA architecture

A preliminary outline (as included in the proposal)

The overarching vision of ANASTACIA is the development of a trustworthy-by-design autonomic security framework that allows testing, validating and optimizing security, from design to deployment and maintenance. The framework relies on diverse enablers to dynamically orchestrate and deploy user security preferences, facilitate the deployment of local agents, and enforce security in heterogeneous scenarios including those based on SDN/NFV and Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks. ANASTACIA will facilitate the testing and vulnerability analysis of the deployed components with simple and user-friendly security policy tools.

The ANASTACIA architecture consists of a set of planes: (i) the data plane that establishes network communication between ANASTACIA components; (ii) the control plane that manages the resource usage and real-time operation of the services; (iii) the autonomic plane that enforces security mechanisms and real-time reconfiguration and adaptation of the services; (iv) the user plane that provides interfaces and tools to end-users for policy definition, service monitoring and management; and (v) the seal management plane that combines security and privacy standards with real time monitoring.

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Use Case 1

Mobile Edge Computing applications

Massive Internet of Things (IoT), either active or dummy devices (sensors/machines), will compose a significant integral part of Future Internet (FI). Besides the internal Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications, the devices will collect huge amount of sensory data regarding themselves and/or their surrounding environments (e.g. temperature and humidity). The data will be traditionally sent to remote data centers/Cloud for further analysis by employing advanced data analytics. That analysis requires high computation capabilities, high bandwidth and low latency. The actions upon the targeted IoT devices will be issued according to the analysis results. In order for the devices to promptly react to the issued actions which are still valid to the current situation, the (extremely) low latency is an essential requirement. Moreover, due to the massive dense deployment of IoT devices, to ensure the targeted device receives the actions exactly on it, highly accurate location data is required. The Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) system deployed at the edge of the mobile network is able to complement the remote data centers, and holds appealing features that are able to fulfill the above-mentioned requirements.

Deploying MEC servers closer to network access points can bring several advantages by reducing the global application latency (computing latency and round-trip time delay), increasing the availability and preventing the emergence of network bottleneck in case of traffic surge. The location of the MEC system is proximate to the IoT devices, which enables fast responses to the real-time events in the IoT domain. Furthermore, its compute/storage capabilities enable the MEC system to perform data regulation and manipulation at the edge, e.g. filtering out inconsequential data, which will offload from the central processing and the backhaul/core network. The configuration of IoT devices can also be done at the edge by taking advantages of the MEC processing capabilities, which will potentially make the IoT devices simpler, smaller, and cheaper, and the IoT domain less vulnerable and more secure.

Ultimately, a MEC ecosystem leveraging SDN and NFV will be formed at the edge of the mobile network, which is a complex and sensitive multi-vendor environment. SDN represents a disruptive change in the way networks are architected, built, and operated. SDN opens up traditionally closed, single-vendor networks and brings competition and innovation to bear on some historically unsolvable networking problems. NFV is commonly described as a network architecture concept that uses IT virtualization technologies to virtualize entire classes of network node functions (firewall, DPI, router, probe, encoder, crypto…) into building blocks that may be connected or chained together to create communication services. Some of the most promoted benefits of NFV include: flexibility, scalability, security and automation. Though SDN and NFV bring an extremely relevant improvement to the previous technologies, in particular in the deployment of MEC server, they also pose new challenges for what concerns cybersecurity, which ANASTACIA technology, with its holistic approach to security, will support addressing.

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Use Case 2

Smart Buildings

In today’s Smart building, all the electrical and mechanical devices (controllers and sensors) such as Heating, Ventilation & Air-conditioning (HVAC), fire detection & suppression, video surveillance and/or a building’s SCADA based microgrid are controlled and monitored by a centralised Building Automation System (BAS). BAS devices are tightly integrated. For example, HVAC systems are now integrated with fire suppression systems for smoke control, and in turn fire suppression systems are integrated with elevators for automatic shutdown in case of fire. Modern BASs include cost effective off-the-shelf IoT (smart) devices such as thermostat, humidity and motion control sensors.

In this context, threats to BASs are on the increase. There are two main factors for this. The first factor is threats due to physical attacks (executed perhaps by insiders). Individuals are fast becoming more knowledgeable of the nuances and intricacies of BASs such that they are ever more capable of executing sophisticated on-site attack scenarios. For example, it might be possible to physically tamper (intentionally or accidentally) with a fire suppression system that not only directly affects that system but causes a cascading threat scenario with its interconnected BASs such as HVAC and Elevator controllers fail to shut-down in accordance with Health and Safety procedures.

The second factor is threats due to cyber-attacks. Traditionally BASs were isolated from ICT systems and as a consequence were considered secure and resilient (assuming no insider threat) despite their lack of security features. This is no longer true. Not only are BASs vulnerable due to a lack of inbuilt security by-design and/or security misconfiguration, but they are now also subject to ICT threats/vulnerabilities such as those caused by their connection to the Internet. For example, a smart building ICT network switch fabric may have an overly permissive access control configuration (in terms of IP addresses and ports) between various BASs such as HVAC controllers and data historians that may not be necessary and an upstream Internet facing firewall may be misconfigured to allow unintended access to a data historian. In addition to that, these two seemingly disjoint threats (overly promiscuous trust on internal control network and improper DMZ access to a data historian) may in fact cause an unforeseen cascade threat such that their composition makes an unsecured HVAC controller accessible from the Internet.

In addition to the threat vector of (unintended) Internet access, management of large scale distributed heterogeneous BASs security mechanisms are complex and requires a security administrator to have deep knowledge of each security mechanisms configuration. Note unlike typical ICT systems, BASs are intended to have a life span on the order of decades. As a consequence, acquiring deep knowledge may not be feasible nor easily transferable. As a consequence, effective security configuration may be hampered by poor understanding and/or management of the enterprise security policy which, in turn, may unnecessarily expose the enterprise to known threats. With today’s emerging threats to Building Automation Systems, effective security configuration is beyond manual analysis and/or human ability.

ANASTACIA technology with its trust and security by-design approach will provide an ideal technology to address these security challenges in BASs and Smart Buildings. The following are examples and a preliminary scenario which will be taken into account, together with others, to demonstrate the project outcomes.

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Work packages and tasks

WP1 - Requirements and Architecture Design (ATOS)

T1.1 - Holistic Security Context Analysis (CNR)

T1.2 - User Centred Requirement Analysis (SOFT)

T1.3 - Architectural Design (ATOS)

WP2 - Security and Trust by Design Enablers (UMU)

T2.1 - Policy-based Definition and Policy for Orchestration (UMU)

T2.2 - Attack Threats Analysis and Contingency Actions (CNR)

T2.3 - Privacy Risk Modelling And Contingecy (MAND)

T2.4 - Secure Software Development Guidelines (ATOS)

WP3 - Policy Enforcement and Run Time Enablers (AALTO)

T3.1 - Security Enforcement Manager (UMU)

T3.2 - Security Orchestrator (AALTO)

T3.3 - Security Enforcement Enablers (THALES)

WP4 - Monitoring and Alert/Reacting Enablers (MONT)

T4.1 - Monitoring Component Services Implementation (MONT)

T4.2 - Reaction Component Services Implementation (CNR)

T4.3 - Agents Development (UTRC)

WP5 - Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal (MAND)

T5.1 - Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal Model Analysis (MAND)

T5.2 - Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal Monitoring Service (AS)

T5.3 - Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal User Interface (DG)

WP6 - Integration and Use Cases Validation (UBITECH)

T6.1 - Technical integration and validation (UBITECH)

T6.2 - Use cases implementation and tests (UTRC)

T6.3 - End-users validation and evaluation (ODINS)

WP7 - Exploitation, Standardization and Dissemination (THALES)

T7.1 - Outreach and Dissemination (AALTO)

T7.2 - Standardization (ERICSSON)

T7.3 - Exploitation Plan (SOFT)

T7.4 - Innovation Management (THALES)

WP8 - Coordination and Management (SOFT)

T8.1 - Overall Project Management (SOFT)

T8.2 - Scientific and Technical Management (UMU)

T8.3 - Quality Assurance (SOFT)

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Deliverables

WP1 - Requirements and Architecture Design (ATOS)

D1.1 Holistic Security Context Analysis (CNR, M6)

D1.2 User-Centred Requirement Initial Analysis (SOFT, M6)

D1.3 Initial Architecture Design (ATOS, M9)

D1.4 Final User-Centred Requirement Analysis (SOFT, M23)

D1.5 Final Architecture Design (ATOS, M36)

WP2 - Security and Trust by Design Enablers (UMU)

D2.1 Policy-based Definition and Policy for Orchestration Initial Report (UMU, M12)

D2.2 Attack Threats Analysis and Contingency Actions Initial Report (CNR, M14)

D2.3 Privacy Risk Modelling and Contingency Initial Report (MAND, M16)

D2.4 Secure Software Development Guidelines Initial Report (ATOS, M18)

D2.5 Policy-based Definition and Policy for Orchestration Final Report (UMU, M24)

D2.6 Attack Threats Analysis and Contingency Actions Final Report (CNR, M26)

D2.7 Privacy Risk Modelling and Contingency Final Report (MAND, M28)

D2.8 Secure Software Development Guidelines Final Report (ATOS, M30)

WP3 - Policy Enforcement and Run Time Enablers (AALTO)

D3.1 Initial Security Enforcement Manager Report (UMU, M15)

D3.2 Initial Security Orchestrator Report (AALTO, M17)

D3.3 Initial Security Enforcement Enablers Report (THALES, M19)

D3.4 Final Security Enforcement Manager Report (UMU, M33)

D3.5 Final Security Orchestrator Report (AALTO, M33)

D3.6 Final Virtual Resources Manager Report (THALES, M33)

WP4 - Monitoring and Alert/Reacting Enablers (MONT)

D4.1 Initial Monitoring Component Services Implementation Report (MONT, M20)

D4.2 Initial Reaction Component Services Implementation Report (CNR, M22)

D4.3 Initial Agents Development Report (UTRC, M24)

D4.4 Final Monitoring Component Services Implementation Report (MONT, M34)

D4.5 Final Reaction Component Services Implementation Report (CNR, M34)

D4.6 Final Agents Development Report (UTRC, M34)

WP5 - Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal (MAND)

D5.1 Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal Model Analysis Report (MAND, M12)

D5.2 Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal Monitoring Service (AS, M24)

D5.3 Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal User Interface (DG, M35)

WP6 - Integration and Use Cases Validation (UBITECH)

D6.1 Initial Technical Integration and Validation Report (UBITECH, M14)

D6.2 Initial Use Cases Implementation and Tests Reports (UTRC, M17)

D6.3 Initial End-User Validation and Evaluation Report (ODINS, M19)

D6.4 Final Technical Integration and Validation Report (UBITECH, M33)

D6.5 Final Use Cases Implementation and Tests Report (UTRC, M35)

D6.6 Final End-User Validation and Evaluation Report (ODINS, M36)

WP7 - Exploitation, Standardization and Dissemination (THALES)

D7.1 Initial Dissemination, Standardization and Outreach Strategy Plan (AALTO, M6)

D7.2 Initial Exploitation and Data Management Plan (SOFT, M6)

D7.3 First Period Dissemination, Standardization and Outreach Report (AALTO, M18)

D7.4 Second Period Dissemination, Standardization and Outreach Report (AALTO, M36)

D7.5 Final Exploitation Plan (SOFT, M36)

WP8 - Coordination and Management (SOFT)

D8.1 1st Periodic Report (SOFT, M18)

D8.2 2nd Periodic Report (SOFT, M36)

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Milestones

M1 Management procedures in place and project started successfully (SOFT, M1)

M2 Initial requirements defined (SOFT, M4)

M3 Initial attack threats analysis performed (CNR, M4)

M4 Initial security enablers descriptions agreed bythe consortium (UMU, M4)

M5 Initial exploitation and dissemination plan defined and adopted (THALES, M4)

M6 Monitoring component service specified and agreed by the board (MONT, M6)

M7 Initial seal integration model defined (MAND, M6)

M8 Initial architecture defined (ATOS, M6)

M9 Initial design phase completed (SOFT, M6)

M10 Communication and dissemination tools developed, including flyer,website and a short video (THALES, M8)

M11 Initial implementaiton of policy enforcement andrun time enablers demonstrated to the consortium (AALTO, M12)

M12 Initial monitoring component service demsontrated to the board (MONT, M12)

M13 Dynaminc Security and Privacy Seal model analysis completed (AS, M12)

M14 Integration, tests and validation process, methodology and tools defined (UBITECH, M12)

M15 Initial enablers development engaged and detailed WP specifications completed (SOFT, M12)

M16 Overall architecture design updated (ATOS, M18)

M17 First cycle of security and trust by design enablers development completed (UMU, M18)

M18 Initial implementation of the Seal monitoring service defined (DG, M18)

M19 First cycle of policy enforcement and run time enablers completed (AALTO, M19)

M20 First cycle of integration and technical validation completed (UBITECH, M19)

M21 First cycle of development of monitoring and alert/reacting enablers demonstrated (MONT, M20)

M22 Firts project review completed successfully (SOFT, M20)

M23 First iterative cycle of development completed (SOFT, M20)

M24 Second cycle of security and trust by design enablers development completed (UMU, M30)

M25 Second cycle of policy enforcement and run timeenablers completed (AALTO, M33)

M26 Second cycle of development of monitoring and alert/reacting enablers demonstrated (MONT, M34)

M27 Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal implementation completed (MAND, M35)

M28 Final iteration of the architecture design completed and made available on the website (ATOS, M36)

M29 Second cycle of integration and technical validation completed (UBITECH, M36)

M30 Dissemination and standardization strategy fully implemented (THALES, M36)

M31 Project completed successfully (SOFT, M36)

M32 Second iterative cycle of development completed and validated (SOFT, M36)

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Objectives

To provide the end users with intuitive and user-friendly tools and solutions to model and configure policies governing the configuration of the security in decentralized and virtualized architectures.

To leverage cloud and SDN/NFV functionalities to allow easy deployment and provide security solution for highly connected CPS/IoT; and, more generally, smart objects communications.

To develop a dynamic Security Enforcement Manager, based on Monitoring and Reaction components, using beyond state-of-the-art vulnerability analysis and security monitoring techniques.

To develop a Dynamic Security and Privacy Seal (DSPS) combining normative requirements (GDPR, ISO standards, etc.) with monitoring functionalities to provide real-time indication on the trustability of a deployed system.

Validation and evaluation of the overall approach in two realistic industrial case studies with high societal and economic impact.

To maintain a strong link to relevant standards and standard bodies.

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